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During the past thirty years, Western industrialized nations 
increasingly have become involved in· the internal dynamics of Third 
world population control policy and progams. Such involvement draws 
largely upon a nee-Malthusian ideology, linking poverty and underdevel-
opment to high fertility rates, and grants to the developed world an 
implicit right to define optimum population levels, as part of a more 
general definition of optimum development. 
For the United States, involvement in foreign population control 
has resulted in more than two decades of policy initiatives grounded in 
a model linking the Malthusian rationale for limiting growth to a con-
cept of "modernization" evolving from Western post-industrial exper-
ience. The importance of this ideological perspective becomes evident 
when both organizational and policy analysis indicate the strength of 
the bureaucracy emerging from the initial concern over the effect of 
prodigious numbers, within the developing world, on its potential as 
a recipient of us corporate investment. What has not been adequately 
explained, however, is that, despite the politicization of the rhetoric 
surrounding issues of fertility regulation and concomitant changes in 
public debate, the bureaucracy of lobbyists, administrators and fund-
ing sources for population regulation remains relatively solid and 
seemingly impervious to rhetorical vagaries. 
Needed, as a supplement to existing demographic and develop-
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mental literature, is a perspective which goes beyond the theoretical 
tensions informing the debate over the relationship between population 
size and resource distribution. Such a perspective would redefine 
present and past involvement in population control as an aspect of 
bureaucratic inertia, thus indicating in a very real manner the tendency 
for organizations to assume a life of their own, often resilient to 
environmental change. 
BACKGROUND TO THE PRESENT SITUATION 
The United States involvement in international population con-
trol is relatively recent, dating back only to the mid-1960s and evolv-
ing out of a post-World War II expansion by government and business 
into the internal dynamics of developing nations. Although a recent 
phenomenon, interest in population control has become a significant 
factor in the government's foreign aid program and has grown into a 
multi-billion dollar budget item. Government and quasi-governmental 
institutions, multinational corporations, universities and research 
centers, private nonprofit agencies and, of course, the recipient pop-
ulations and governments are all involved in the implementation, ad-
ministration and practice of regulating fertility within the nations of 
the Third World. 
Recently, what appears to be a more conservative stance, advocat-
ed by the White House and certain segments of the general public, has 
led to interest in implementing major policy change in US population 
programs and a reduction in federal funding earmarked for multilateral 
support of fertility regulation. Those supporting a more conservative 
governmental role in overseas family planning express strong ideological 
objections to the perceived immorality of "artificial" methods of birth 
control or the use of abortion as a viable alternative for limiting the 
number of children born (cf., Ellen Goodman, Chicago Tribune, September 
5, 1985). Critics of this position, as well as the existing political 
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climate, contend that such a shift will prove devastating to the "gains" 
made in regulating fertility in the developing world and to future pop-
ulation control programs, viewed as essential to the continued economic 
and social development of these nations. However, while this ideolog-
ical shift portends a somewhat altered role for the United States in 
its dealings with growth and development in the Third world, evidence 
suggests that the core of interest groups, identified in population and 
development literature as the "population establishment"· (cf., Demerath 
1976), is so firmly entrenched in the affairs of developing nations 
that its withdrawal is unlikely. 
At a time of concerted effort to change the nature and degree of 
US participation in international population policies, it is important 
to examine the linkages between population control and economic and 
developmental aid. Such linkages are significant because they facili-
tate an implicit form of control over personal and public decisions, 
made possible through the articulation of population programs with 
other forms of US foreign policy. 
Since the 1950s, when such well-known philanthropists as the 
Fords and Rockefellers expressed concern over the relationship between 
fertility rates and economic development, the United States position, 
informed by nee-Malthusian ideology, has located population control 
within a range of foreign economic and development policies. The 
issue of controlling numbers within the Third World has become part 
of the much larger developmental perspective in which social and 
economic advancement requires a reduction in the birth rate in the 
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Third World. If the United States began to move away from its estab-
lished practice of integrating population control into.other forms of 
developmental aid, this would then require a redefining of the essential 
components of "modernization" and of alternatives available for legiti-
mating continued US presence within the developing world. 
Central to an informed assessment of population control policy 
and its implementation is an understanding of the apparent resilience 
of the core of interest groups, connnonly referred to as the "population 
establishment," to the vagaries of domestic ideological and political 
rhetoric. Although the literature on US foreign aid and Third World 
demographics frequently addresses linkages between capitalist interests 
and population control, little attempt has been made to trace system-
atically the emerging strength of the population establishment. In 
order to fully comprehend the importance and pervasiveness of its role 
at multiple levels, the population establishment must be seen as some-
thing more than a group of "hungry" imperialists; rather, its power 
and foothold can be explained more appropriately as an aspect of 
bureaucratic inertia, emanating from the tightly woven network of 
interest groups and representing a multiplicity of corporate capital-
ism's goals and strategies. 
Thus, an informed understanding of the relationship between 
population programs, foreign aid and corporate capitalism requires a 
"mapping" of the interconnections within the network of public and 
private agencies/organizations involved in the funding, administering 
and dispensing of the goods and services of population control. By 
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locating this network within the various manifestations of public pol-
icy and its debate, it is possible to demonstrate how specific corporate 
/industrial interests combine with government at the decision-making 
level. Such interests are then exerted bilaterally and multilaterally 
and assume a bureaucratic structure of their own, resilient to variation 
in domestic politics. 
Two important features emerge when the issue of population con-
trol is located historically and when the corresponding link between 
the enactment of relevant legislation and dominant interests is analyz-
ed. On the one hand, efforts to reduce fertility rates are shown to be 
an important element in the struggle of Western capitalism to maintain 
a secure position in the Third World. On the other hand, specific leg-
. islation regarding birth control and family planning often obscures, or 
is obscured by, issues of foreign economic development to which the 
funding and implementation of population control programs frequently 
attaches itself. 
It, therefore, becomes necessary to examine the tensions between 
public policy, private interest and perceived need to formulate a model 
of the role of corporate capitalism in the emergence of official pop-
ulation policy. It is also necessary to understand how the nature of 
the issues muddies the impact of specific policy measures and obscures 
linkages between the public and private domain. 
Both the application and the analysis of US population control 
policy have been criticized for defining the needs and composition of 
developing nations as uniform (Segal, 1973) and for failing to acknow-
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ledge the differential effect of indigenous culture and ideology on 
the acceptance of our population policies. However, this very failure 
to recognize variability among and within developing nations is, in 
fact, a critical element of US policy, reflecting the use of population 
control to ensure a range of goals of political and economic expedience. 
The government's failure to acknowledge variation simplifies the passage 
of relevant legislation, supports a uniform categorical definition for 
all developing nations, allows greater external control and promulgates 
the ideology that " •.• prolific numbers were responsible for their (the 
Third World's) inability to share in the imperialist pie" (Mass, 1976: 
50). 
The focus of this thesis is to formulate a framework for the 
analysis of US population control policy, using as a central integrat-
ing factor the pervasiveness of the population establishment, while 
incorporating into the discussion a number of problematics posed by 
such an analysis. In particular, the steady growth in dollars invested 
in overseas population control will be contrasted to rhetorical shifts 
in the ideology surrounding fertility and its regulation. It is posit-
ed that the issues encompassing rapid population growth provide a means 
for a significant level of explicit and implicit control over numerous 
other Third World issues. Control is exerted, among other ways, 
through the apparatus of foreign policy. Its benefits accrue to both 
the public and private sector, offering one possible explanation to 
continued involvement in fertility practices within the Third world. 
Equally important, are the dynamics of those influencing policy 
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and appropriations. Those most integral to the evolution of the US 
position consistently have represented an influential sector within 
corporate capitalism. Many advocating a continued us presence in foreign 
population programs today were among the early advocates of government 
support for Third World population programs or represent corporate 
boards or foundations first active in the issue of controlling "over-
population." The continued importance of the population establishment 
can be shown by identifying its presence at the decision-making level 
of both federal policy and the agencies involved in funding or imple-
menting family planning programs. By examining testimony, various 
types of government documents, newspapers, periodicals and other second-
ary data which indicate the type of pressure exerted on behalf of those 
supporting some type of population control effort, the thesis will 
demonstrate the strength of a bureaucracy initiated by corporate cap-
italism and its eventual ability to withstand significant change at the 
administrative level of government. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF POPULATION CONTROL 
Any interpretation of existing policy and its relationship to 
corporate capitalism requires first locating the significant ideologies 
informing fertility practices within the historical context in which 
they evolved and then examining the way in which these historically 
specific ideological developments continue to exert an influence on 
contemporary practices. ~ In addition, it must be remebered that the 
theoretical perspectives informing critical policy evaluation reflect 
the tensions inherent in ideologies embedded in issues of poverty, 
population size and resource distribution, thus appearing to encourage 
at times a rather schismatic approach to policy analysis. 
The theoretical dichotomy found in the literature dealing with 
us participation in the regulation of Third World populations evidences 
the above mentioned tension. Such dichotomy or schism indicates the 
lack of consensus over a causal model relating class, fertility and 
distribution of scarce resources. Consequently, rapidly growing 
populations tend to be characterized in one of two ways: as either a 
cause of sustained underdevelopment and general levels of deprivation 
or as a consequence of impoverishment, indeed a rational response to 
the exigencies of a peasant economy. 
Traditionally, the official view of the US government has been 
that excessive population among the poor of Third World nations 
inhibits necessary social reform and economic development. Such a 
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view was reflected in the initial stages of the US population policy 
debate, apparent in Lyndon Johnson's 1966 speech: "Our new element 
in today's world is the threat of mass hunger and starvation. Popula-
tions are exploding under the impact in sharp cuts in the death rate" 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1966: 1243). 
Countering the proscription against sustained high fertility, is 
the position held by much of the Third World itself (Michaelson, 1981), 
as well as Western critics of existing policy and practice, many of 
whom espouse a Marxist perspective. This position contends that 
Western intervention in controlling population merely acts as a 
"diversion from the real problems of disease, illiteracy and unjust 
distribution of resources" (Mass, 1976: 67). Critics of US policy 
maintain that for peasant populations in developing nations, large 
numbers of children still represent the best chance of the long-term 
survival for a family, as well as a source of much needed human re-
sources. Families, therefore, continue to represent a variety of 
resources and failure to recognize this indicates the inability of the 
United States to acknowledge the role of ideology as an important 
determinant of eventual declines in birth rates (Savara, 1983). 
Although the theoretical basis of existing literature is 
broadly informed by perspectives ranging from Malthus to Marx, none 
of it accounts adequately for the compl~x integration of public and 
private interests manifest in US population policy. It is too simple 
to see the issue only in terms of coporate expansion or as a technical 
debate over appropriate strategy. Present day practice can only be 
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understood through an understanding of the importance of the popul_ation 
establishment, as an entity unto itself, which reflects the vested 
interest of corporate capitalism but, more importantly, which has 
achieved a size and international role, that ensure its continuation. 
**** 
The debate over optimal population size and economic development 
has its origins in two perspectives emerging during the nineteenth 
century which continue to exert significant influence. Indeed, it is 
surprising how little the parameters encompassing the issues concerning 
fertility have changed during the past century and a half. 
Early in the nineteenth century Thomas Malthus produced his 
widely publicized treatise, relating population growth to the potential 
"to produce subsistence for man" (Mass, 1976 16). Malthus' -work became 
the basis for the contention that the rapidly expanding class of indus-
trial poor would prove to be a disproportionate drain on the resources 
available to society as a whole. From this perspective evolved the 
ideological agenda of most of the twentieth century Western population 
policy which advocates strong measures to limit the growth of the poor 
and/or peasant populations, in order to ensure the continued availa-
bility of necessary ·goods and resources. 
In the early twentieth century, nee-Malthusians adopted the 
eugenicist tenets of social Darwinism. Largely in response to the 
influx of Southern blacks and foreign immigrants into the labor force 
of the urban North, the US eugenicists condoned practices limiting the 
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expansion of groups they labelled biologically inferior, whose uncheck-
ed birthrate was believed to contribute to an "overall deterioration of 
the human genetic stock" (Michaelson, 1981: 14). As a result, there 
evolved an ideology supporting fertility regulation within the colonized 
world, on the grounds that the rapidly expanding number of indigenous 
poor 1N0uld only inhibit "necessary" economic and social development. 
Implicit in such an ideological commitment to population control was 
the eugenic conception of the inherent inferiority of those groups 
whose growth rates were of concern. This position integrated easily 
into the attitude that colonialization legitima~ed the right to influ-
ence personal choice in the interest of modernization and was consis-
tent with the paternalistic attitude of Western colonial powers~~ 
The alignment of Planned Parenthood with the eugenicist move-
ment during the 1920s reflected an increasingly racially motivated 
ideological basis to the early family planning movement. The eugenic 
bias has continued to influence attitudes which look to lowered fer-
tility as a means of eradicating poverty. This was particularly so 
during the 1960s, the formative period of US family planning policy. 
Both at home and abroad, the War on Poverty era marked a time in which 
it was assumed that unchecked fertility was a major cause of the 
poverty and deprivation recently "discovered" by the state. 
A counter view, linking population growth, poverty and economic 
development to the expansion of capitalism emerged in the nineteenth 
century writings of Marx and Engels. In response to the uncritical 
acceptance of Malthusian theory, Marxism argued that an impoverished 
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working class was endemic to the need of capitalism to maintain a 
"surplus" of cheap and submissive labor. From this perspective, the 
source of societal ills of poverty and oppression was located within 
the structure of capitalism itself, not, as argued by Malthus and his 
followers, in the, unchecked growth of the poor or inferior segments of 
society. 
(A surplus of labor) forms a disposable industrial 
reserve army, that belongs to capital quite as 
absolutely as if the latter bred it at its own cost. 
Independently of the limits of the actual increase 
of population, it creates, for the changing needs of 
the self-expansion of capital, a mass of human material 
always ready for exploitation. (Marx, 1978: 430) 
Marx encouraged high fertility among the 'WOrking class as a means of 
ensuring their emergent strength (cf., Tucker, 1978). This view has 
been retained and is articulated by a number of those within the Third 
World critical of Western intervention in their fertility practices. 
As would many of his successors, Marx tended to view Malthusian 
rhetoric as legitimation for the unequal distribution of available 
resources. The problem was simply not too many people nor an inad-
equate food supply; rather, it was the control over necessities exert-
ed by the capitalists and the subsequent maldistribution of the means 
for existence. By focusing on the fertility patterns of the poor, 
capitalism absolved itself of any responsibility for the social 
reorganization necessary to alleviate poverty. Furthermore, it 
placed the blame for the impoverished living condition of the poor, 
on the poor themselves. 
Twentieth century nee-Marxists have integrated theories of 
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population into their perspectives on dependency and imperialism. The 
more radical contend that high fertility and population growth are not 
a negative factor in the level of social and economic development 
experienced by the urban poor and Third World peasant populations. 
Large families reflect a particular kind of response to economic 
demands and to longstanding norms valuing many children for a number of 
reasons (Mamdani, 1981; Michaelson, 1981). The poor continue to exper-
ience high fertility rates because they lack access to more convention-
al avenues for "getting ahead" or for economic security. High fertil-
ity, therefore, is not a cause of poverty, but a rational response to 
it (Michaelson, 1981). For those adhering to this position, all 
attempts of the West to regulate population within the developing 
world are suspect, seen largely as an extension of imperialism in 
controlling the lives of indigenous populations for the purpose of 
fostering a particular type of economic growth~ . 
A more moderate view recognizes that family planning can be one 
aspect to the alleviation of Third World poverty; however, this posi-
tion also calls for active participation on the part of the West in 
the redistribution of needed resources and for increased local auton-
omy in matters of family planning and population control. The 1974 
statement of the World Population Conference reflects the developing 
nations' recognition of the complexities linking population growth 
and diminishing resources. Conference members rejected the US posi-
tion that overpopulation was the major contributor to the world's 
developmental problems, identifying instead "the unequal process of 
15 
socio-economic development (and) the lack of equity in internationsl 
economic relations" (Pajaeska 1974: 155). Moderate neo-Marxists, there-
fore, advocate greater local decision-making and increased recognition 
of the complex interrelationship between population size and the level 
of economic development. The social relations of particular classes 
or groups,- as important determinants of fertility practices, must be 
located historically and within a context in which the significance 
of the relations of production,- the distribution of resources and class 
oppression is clarified (Mamdani, 1981). 
Indeed, Michaelson (1981) notes the limited success of the 
developing world in redefining an acceptable balance between population 
control and other forms of assistance following the 1974 Bucharest 
Conference. At this time there were indications of both greater local 
autonomy in decisions regarding population programs and some change 
in US attitude and policy. Nevertheless, changes which significantly 
threatened established practices and vested corporate interests receiv-
ed little, if any, serious consideration. Despite the fact, the 
possibility remains for developing nations to benefit from Western 
technology made available for family planning,· if receipt of such 
technology can be monitored in a way to insure local power and deci-
sion-making. 
As shall be shown, the US approach to economic and technical 
assistance to the Third World originated during a period of intense 
corporate expansion into new markets and sources of raw materials; 
therefore, appropriations and program design have tended to reflect 
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the interests of a highly visible and powerful segment of the private 
sector. The Malthusian model, linking population size to economic 
potential, integrated easily into the evolving model of development 
espoused by the United States and most of the Western world. Despite 
changes in the Third World and in domestic ideology, the rationale for 
population control among the poor continues to emanate from a perspec-
tive in which an inevitable consequence of "overpopulation" continues 
to be the sustained underdevelopment of peasant populations. 
Recently, literature in the area of policy analysis has begun 
to integrate these diverse perspectives, calling for a recognition of 
the reciprocal relationship between population, distribution of re-
sources and potential for social and economic development in the Third 
World (Clinton, 1973; Sewell, 1980). By limiting fertility, while 
simultaneously addressing the need for greater equality in the distrib-
ution of goods and resources, it is argued that the standard of living 
of many of the Third World poor might rise significantly. This liter-
ature does acknowledge the role of capitalist expansion in the oppres-
sion of developing nations and the inability of existing policy to 
address the multitude of causes of deprivation facing developing 
nations. However, it remains to be seen whether new policies will 
emerge and whether they will continue to obscure, albeit in different 
ways, the need for structural reorganization and the numerous ways 
the consumption needs of capitalism are realized through seemingly 
benevolent policy. 
As later comments will indicate, Reagan's emphasis on develop-
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ment within the private sector and his attitude that population is an 
"inherently neutral" factor in development (Congressio:r:ial Quarterly, 
9/1/84: 214) seem more in keeping with tenets of twentieth century 
Marxism than with the Malthusian model historically providing the 
framework for the US family planning policy. 
The previous discussion centers around the appropriateness of 
Western population control programs within the developing world and 
hinges on the tension between population and resource distribution. 
This perspective is only one aspect of the complexity linking US 
interests to Third World problems and is not, for the purposes of this 
thesis, the critical issue for understanding the continued US commit-
ment in the area of family planning. Studies such as that of Demerath 
(1976) and Mass (1976), point to the impact of the vasted interests of 
a corporate elite on the evolutions of US foreign population policy. 
From this perspective, population control efforts work to ensure a 
stable environment for Western investment and industrial expansion and 
provide a means for the needs of corporate capitalism to be reflected 
in the policies of the West and East. Piotrow's 1973 study of the 
pressure for federal intervention, exerted by influential representa-
tives of corporate capitalism, affirms the tendency towards a "patern-
alistic philanthropy of coporate capitalism" (Knox, Bohland and 
Shumsky, 1984: 161), implemented to secure corporate viability at 
home and abroad, as a post-war scepticism over the endurance of 
competitive markets became more pervasive (cf, John Kenneth Galbraith, 
1985; The New Industrial State, 4th edition, for a discussion of the 
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changing power structure of corporate capitalism). 
It is, in fact, the magnitude of the financial interests grow-
ing out of such "paternalistic philanthropy" which has been of major 
importance to the establishment and continuation of the population 
establishment. The critical importance of the developing world, as a 
market for corporate America, has led to more than the expansion of 
multinational firms abroad and to various efforts to protect invest-
ments; it also has led to the growth of a complex network of public and 
private support organizations whose existence facilitates the continued 
presence of corporate capitalism in the Third world and the flow of 
relevant information. The population establishment is one dimension 
of this network. 1 
These theoretical constructs provide a necessary element to an 
understanding of the actual policy and practice of US population 
control interests. However, a fully informed understanding also 
requires locating involvement in foreign population control histori-
cally and then turning to specifics in its development, as an aspect 
of the more generalized area of foreign economic and developmental 
aid. Such a perspective necessarily will incorporate the role of the 
population establishment network into a final picture of the place of 
fertility regulation within the politics of foreign policy. 
1. Also included would be the World Bank, The World Health 
Organization and other such organizations whose funding, 
administration and activities are in some way tied to the 
interests of major corporations and financial institutions. 
THE HISTORY OF US FOREIGN POPULATION CONTROL POLICY 
Federal involvement in world population issues evolved from· 
growing private sector interest in the post-World War II population 
expansion, as advancements in public health, sanitation and standards 
of living significantly lowered mortality in developing nations, with-
out a subsequent decline in fertility. In contrast to similar advances 
experienced a century earlier in the Western world, where better health 
care and improved living conditions accompanied industrialization and 
preceeded both declining fertility and mortality rates, " ••. in the poor 
nations of the twentieth century, death rates have been lowered with 
little or no industrialization" (Demerath, 1~76: 4). Consequently, 
indigenous attitudes and practices continue to reflect the needs and 
structural constraints of a rural, peasant economy. For much of the 
Western world, the reality of Third World demographics became more 
focused with the expansion of corporate interests into the newly avail-
able markets of developing nations. 
During the 1950s, in particular, United States' interest in the 
internal affairs of underdeveloped nations was spurred by a burgeoning 
pest-war economy and by an increasingly unstable international climate, 
marked by nationalist movements among European colonies, numerous 
indigenous revolutions and the ramifications of a "Cold War" mentality. 
Industrial and corporate interests manifested themselves in interna-
tional expansion through the establishment of an extensive network of 
foreign markets; acquisition of rights to natural resources; involve-
19 
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ment in foreign monetary systems and demand for an adequate supply of 
inexpensive labor. Such interests required security and stability in 
areas of foreign expansion and investment, and one way in which secur-
ity might be ensured was through participation in economic and social 
development. A significant impediment to this development was perceiv-
ed to be the rapid expansion of Third World populations, especially 
among the peasant underclass. 
Because of a perception of unstable political and social 
conditions in many of the developing nations, a nee-Malthusian ideology 
regarding population expansion was integrated easily into policy 
directives, based on requirements of international stability and market 
expandability. The perceived threat of rapidly expanding lower classes, 
already shared by many involved in domestic population control efforts, 
came to inform an assessment of an appropriate mode of involvement in 
the internal dynamics of the changing Third World. Control over the 
masses would guarantee greater internal stability and control implied, 
among other things, limiting the number of potential participants in 
riots or civil unrest. Exemplifying this was the extensive research 
originating in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s used to 
support the Puerto Rican government's efforts to establish an official 
family planning policy for the island (Wessman, 1981). Population 
reports such as those of Hatt (1952) and Perloff (1950) were the 
later basis of the Hernandez-Colon administration's call for govern-
ment family planning programs. In a speech at Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, Puerto Rican Governor Hernandez-Colon expressed the joint con-
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cern of the United States and his administration that escalating popu-
lation growth in the developing world necessitated "more energy to the 
maintenance of order" (quoted in Wessman, 1981: 198). 
At this point in the history·of capitalist-industrial expansion, 
concern over numbers superceded a concern over the long-range market 
effect of restricting the fertility of the masses. Peasants and the 
poor of developing nations were not originally considered important 
sources of buying power in the precapitalist societies of the Third 
World. Their value as a source of inexpensive labor power exceeded 
that of potential participants in Third World markets or "peripheral 
capitalism" (Alavi, 1982). Possible insurgency was a greater reality 
to Western capitalists than potential changes in the international 
economic structure which might one day more fully incorporate the 
peasant worker into profit realization. Therefore, corporate expan-
sion/philanthropy, backed by nee-Malthusian ideology, tended to per-
ceive population restriction as more effective for internal stabili-
zation than massive resource redistribution. 
Expansion, unstable world politics and the tendency toward an 
increasingly producer-defined market all culminated in a new corporate 
awareness of the potential value of active intervention in the intern-
al affairs of the rapidly changing less developed nations. Interven-
tion assumed a cooperative posture on the part of potential investors 
in order to exert a more definitive influence. Hence, as Demerath 
(1976) notes, during the 1950s, there emerged numerous population 
"interest groups" which coalesced around common concerns of corporate 
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expansion into the underdeveloped nations of the world. These groups 
shared interests and a perspective on international development similar 
to interests emerging in the area of world banking. They relied heavi-
ly on market mechanisms, measured by growth of the per capita GNP, as 
indicators of prosperity and advancement out of the poverty of under-
development. Rapid population expansion continued to be perceived as 
an inhibitor not only to national security, but to stable capital form-
ation and to rising GNP, prerequesites for US investors (Bondestam, 
1982) • 
At this time, the interest group, or the population establish-
ment, as it has come to be called, consisted mainly of members of 
large foundations (i.e., the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations), wealthy 
Eastern families and a growing body of philanthropic/research organ-
izations, all of which had been involved earlier in issues of conser-
vation, demography and population. For the most part, this body per-
ceived the relationship between population and development in a neo-
Mal thusian context, identifying the poor of the Third World as a 
major inhibitor to a stable political climate, to the continued avail-
ability of natural resources and to the expansion of an educated and 
capable Third World elite (Bondestams, 1982). 
Seven organizations evolved from the early activities of the 
1950s. They reflect an intricate network of corporate influence and 
continue to function as the primary determinants of family planning 
within the developing world (Demerath, 1976). These organizations 
are the Population Council, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller 
23 
Foundation and Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Population Crisis 
Conunittee, the International Planned Parenthood Federation, the us 
Agency for International Development and, to a somewhat lesser extent, 
the Council on Foreign Relations. 
In 1952, under the sponsorship of the National Academy of 
Sciences, John D. Rockefeller III convened a population conference in 
Williamsburg, Virginia, from which emerged the Population Council of 
America. Early efforts of those involved in the population movement 
received funding from the private sector and mainly involved demograph-
ic and biomedical research. Commenting later on the growth of the 
population establishment and the incorporation of private funding into 
the research and technology used eventually to influence public policy, 
John D. Rockefeller III said, "At the time we started work, any govern-
ment participation would have been politically unthinkable" (Rocke-
feller, 1969; quoted in Demerath, 1976: 38). Rockefeller's remark 
reflects the extent to which the issues of reproduction lay outside 
the public domain, until they could be joined with the less volatile 
issues of international security and economic development. 
The demarcation between public and private interests narrowed 
as expansion and a heightened awareness of US dependency on the raw 
materials of the Third World intensified the concern for more perma-
nent, legitimate means to ensure a secure footing for the newly defin-
ed needs of corporate capitalism. Although an argument can be made 
supporting the humanitarian goals of the population establishment 
(and indeed, so should be made), sufficient evidence exists to 
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support the contention that concern for conditions of the impoverished 
Third World emerged only after the need for expanded markets and for 
raw materials, no longer available locally. For example, John D. 
Rockefeller III, as chair of the President's International Advisory 
Board in the 1950s, estimated that almost seventy-five percent of the 
raw materials used in production in the United States at that time 
were imported from Asia, Africa and Latin America (Mass, 1976). The 
need for new sources of materials and penetration of foreign markets 
corresponded with technological improvements in transportation and 
corrnnunication following World war II which greatly facilitated the 
ability to locate multinational sites within the developing world. 
Between 1950 and 1969, US firms expanded their direct foreign invest-
ment at an annual rate of ten percent per year, resulting in the 
doubling of foreign investment within ten years (Hymer, 1982). 
As an ever growing segment of the private sector became 
involved in some aspect of global industrial expansion, the need for 
stability insured by an official US presence in the Third World became 
clear. The familiar nee-Malthusian rhetoric served to legitimate a 
particular form of US intervention. According to Edgar Berman of the 
Alliance for Progress, high fertility rates were central to the most 
severe problems being experienced in the developing world. The cycle 
of social unrest, "capital depletion and resource shrinkage" caused 
by rapid population growth proved to be extremely threatening to the 
expectations of corporate profit and growth on the part of US capital 
(Mass, 1976: 72). To the extent that the rapidly expanding classes of 
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poor throughout the world were perceived as a major threat to national 
security and to domestic and international prosperity, pressure 
mounted for official involvement in population control, as part of a 
more inclusive model of foreign development policy. The Coale-Hoover 
thesis, advanced by two members of Princeton's Department of Interna-
tional and Public Affairs, outlined the impending threat to economic 
advancement posed by the mounting population growth rates in developing 
countries and later became a basis for justifying governmental aid to 
population control programs (Coale-Hoover, 1958; Tapinos and Piotrow, 
1978). 
Thus, the needs of corporate capital quickly became equated 
with the need to insure international security, both of which were 
subsumed under the ideology of the need to control the populations of 
the Third World for the benefit of the developing nation. The idea 
that reducing fertility rates in the Third World was tantamount to 
guaranteeing political stability is revealed clearly in a 1969 Rocke-
feller speech broadcast over the Voice of America: 
My \VOrk with the Population Council has convinced 
me more than ever that the population problem is as 
important as any problem facing mankind today, including 
even peace. 
will not be 
(1969: 5) 
In the long run, true and enduring peace 
possible without stabilized population growth. 
The work of the Population Council provided some of the early 
academic and scientific backing to issues of population control and 
served as an important factor in securing financial and political 
approval for this heretofore sensitive subject. The Council came to 
typify the integration of public and private interests involved in 
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foreign population programs and policies. Early board members included 
not only Rockefeller, but Frank Bourdreau of the Milbank Memorial Fund 
and Frank Notestein of the Office of Population Research (Mass, 1976). 
In 1959, General William Draper, chairman of a presidential 
committee on military security, testified before a Congressional hear-
ing on the "need" for federal involvement in foreign population control. 
Commenting later on his experience with the committee, Draper said: 
We visited most of the developing countries and 
concluded that their exploding population was in 
many cases holding back their economic development. 
We unanimously agreed that the United States should 
assist any of them that wanted such help ••• (to) install 
birth control programs. (Mass, 1976: 43) 
Draper, a former Under-Secretary of the Army, investment banker 
and Chairman of the Board of the Mexican Light and Power Company, 
eventually became chairman of the Population Crisis Committee, the 
chief source of funding for the Washington lobby for private sector 
population issues. He exemplifies the link between the interest of 
private industry, the military and the federal government that came to 
characterize figures central to US population control issues. Draper's 
speech reflects a position which has been maintained consistently since 
the early days of population control politics. The federal government 
continuously has excluded mandatory family planning as part of its 
stated foreign policy. However, as will be commented upon later, the 
nature of legislation and appropriation, coupled with the particularly 
volatile nature of population control, worked to produce conditions 
in which the receipt of economic assistance was predicated upon the 
"willingness" of developing nations to adopt US recommendations for 
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limiting their population growth rates. 
Private sector interest in fertility patterns, family planning 
and variation in socio-economic well-being continued throughout the 
fifties. The rhetoric associated with issues of growth and fertility 
reflected a commitment to an ideology identifying uncontrolled repro-
ductive practices as the most significant impediment to a Western 
model of development and to the eradication of poverty in the Third 
World. Typifying the rhetoric of the time was T.O. Greissimer's 
popular book, The Population Bomb. The book described the earth as a 
"ticking time-bomb which can be set off at any moment, resulting in a 
population explosion that invites war and communism" (Mass, 1976: 40). 
The Population Bomb was published by the Hugh Moore Fund, a private 
philanthropic foundation, founded by the Dixie CUp Corporation. Hugh 
Moore himself was responsible for involving many corporate and finan-
cial executives in the activities of population organizations. Later, 
the Fund sponsored a series of full-page newspaper ads, signed by 
influencial members of population control groups, advocating govern-
mental participation in efforts to check the rapidly expanding popula-
tions of impoverished masses. Piotrow (1973) ~learly delineates the 
type of pressure placed on Congress and the executive branch, by an 
influential segment of the corporate class, advocating a more defini-
tive commitment to family planning endeavors. 
Private sector interest and involvement in population control, 
initiated in the 1950s, continued into the 1960s with growing pressure 
on the government to become more directly involved in population con-
trol programs, both locally and abroad. A number of reports and 
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testimony appeared assessing the potentially unstable political condi-
tions in Latin America and much of the Third World and calling for the 
government of the United States to use family planning programs as a 
means of reducing political and economic situations unfavorable to 
corporate/industrial growth (cf., Population Reference Bureau, Latin 
America, What Price Evasion?; Katherine and A.F.K. Organiski, Popula-
tion and World Power; World Bank President Eugene Black's report to 
UN Economic and Social Council, 1965). 
At this point, it seems appropriate to locate the interest in 
overseas population programs within the more general framework of 
resource transfers between nations which escalated in the 1950s and 
1960s. Such transfers were informed by a variety of political, 
economic and moral reasoning and a significant part of the transfer of 
resources came to be grouped under the ruberic of "aid." Differences 
in type of resource and the manner in which it was administered and 
delivered often became blurred. "'Aid' was discussed as if it were 
one kind of resource, administered by one kind of institution called 
an 'aid agency', within the frame"WOrk of a single and coherent strategy 
called 'aid policy'" (White, 1974: 12). Not only did such simplifica-
tion obscure the real needs of recipient nations, it also worked to 
obscure the multiplicity of vested interests promoting various aspects 
of foreign aid. Obfuscation certainly was a factor in the way in 
which the need for involvement in population control was perceived. 
From the very first, fertility, development and national security were 
inexorably intertwined, as the United States moved more solidly into 
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the position of a major economic power and a primary dispenser of 
international aid. As reported by Robert Lamson for t~e Department of 
the Army, the instability caused by rapid growth necessitated "programs 
and forces to maintain internal order and to def end against guerilla 
warfare" (1966: 23). In many ways, involvement in issues of fertility 
and the regulation of family size legitimated other areas of involve-
ment in the developing world and acted to defuse potential criticism 
of other, more political, less apparently humane, types of interven-
tion. 
The rapid change occurring within much of the Third World by the 
mid-twentieth century was both advantageous and threatening to US 
interests and provided a context against which a more complex type of 
US overseas presence was deemed necessary. The United States was 
attempting to retain a secure footing in the transition from agricul-
ture to industry experienced by many less developed nations. "Over-
population" continued to be equated with impediments to industrial-
ization in these countries. World Bank President, Eugene Black stated, 
"Population growth does not only tend to reduce the flow of investment 
funds. It also means that the capital invested in industry must be 
spread increasingly thin ..• " (Cited in Mudd, 1965: 475). Mass (1976) 
suggests that the failure of the Alliance for Progress to gain 
sufficient concessions and positive trade agreements to satisfy the 
growing body of capitalists interested in investing in the developing 
world was an important factor in the continued pressure being applied 
by the population establishment to secure government involvement in 
the internal operations of the Third World. The Malthusian admoni-
tions against unchecked population growth in the developing world 
expanded upon more the traditional strategies attempting to retain 
influential positions in an ever-changing world situation. By the 
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early 1960s, the link between development, national security and popu-
lation control had been legitimated for many in the private sector. 
It remained only to convince those in Congress that economic and 
political gains could be more easily secured if coupled with government-
sponsored family planning programs. 
In 1964, the Office of Population was established within the 
Alliance for Progress and during the first year of its existence the 
director successfully pursuaded the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
to fund two population studies in Latin America. Shortly thereafter, 
the Population Crisis Committee was established, chaired by former 
Senator Kenneth Keating (R-NY). Its legislative mandate was "support 
of bills and appropriations encouraging wider federal participation in 
research, training and operational programs to deal with the population 
crisis" (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1963: 313). In the same-
year, Congress, supported by President Johnson, turned its attention 
for the first time to the issues of direct federal involvement in 
foreign and domestic population control. During hearings by the 
Senate Government Operations Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, 
a wide range of testimony from people such as John D. Rockefeller III; 
William Draper; Dr. Frederick Seitz of the National Academy of 
Sciences; Gladys A. Tillet, US representative to the UN Commission 
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on the status of Women; Reps. John Conyers (D-Mich) and Morris Udall 
(D-AZ) and Committee Chairman Ernest Greuning (D-Alaska) supported 
increased federal participation in issues of population control 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1965). 
Testifying before the 1965 Senate population Crisis Hearings, 
Dr. Edgar Berman of the Alliance's Office of Population presented an 
equation in support of US involvement in Third World fertility patterns: 
The political instability of a developing nation can 
be roughly computed •.• The population's growth rate 
divided by a factor representing economic and social 
development equals the degree of political instability. 
Pop. growth/Econ. & Social Development = Instability 
(Cited in Mass, 1976: 45) 
The hearings resulted in US AID missions to Latin America being 
advised that, "population control programs are to be considered a 
priority area" (Piotrow, 1973: 86). 
The culmination of intense private sector effort was evidenced 
in the next two pieces of legislation that were to shape the direction 
of the United States' participation in foreign population control 
throughout the coming decade and a half. Two features to the initial 
legislation typify US family planning policy. The first appropriations 
for population programs came as an amendment to existing foreign policy 
legislation and combined funding for family planning with economic 
and development aid. In 1966, PL480, the Agricultural Trade and 
Development Act (1954) was amended to include the Food for Peace 
Program. This amendment changed the scope of the original act, from 
a means of dispersing agricultural surplus to that of direct economic 
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and developmental assistance. Food and Peace included funds to increase 
foreign food production, both by stimulating agricultural production 
abroad and by taking measures to control population. In 1968, the 
Foreign Assistance Act (1961) was also amended to include $35 million 
in appropriations to US AID for overseas population control activities, 
a figure which was to triple by 1971. In both instances, funding was 
made contingent upon "self-help" efforts within the developing nations. 
"The key to victory is self-help. Aid must be accompanied by a major 
effort on the part of those who receive it", said President Johnson in 
his "Food for Peace" speech, February 10, 1966 (Congressional Quarterly 
Almanac, 1966: 1243). Decisive in the determination of an appropriate 
indication of self-help was the recipient nation's willingness to accept 
American funding and technology for family planning. 
At this point in the evolution of population policy, as an aspect 
of development and economic aid, a reduction in the growth rates of the 
impoverished nations of the world was considered an expedient measure 
in efforts both to raise general standards of living and to ensure 
continued expansion of us markets within the·developing world. The 
incorporation of population control into US foreign policy did not 
weaken the activities of the private sector; rather, federal approp-
riations to the private sector not only becamQ an important source of 
funding, but acted to strengthen the link between private interests 
and public activities. The multitude of agencies, variously associated 
with population control, health care and economic development, result-




larger corporate interests could be realized and which, additional~y, 
stood to benefit from government funding and contracts. Involvement 
insured the presence of corporate capitalism in other issues of 
international concern--particularly those issues of greatest potential 
consequence to the long-range planning of international finance and 
economic expansion. 
Additionally, family planning and its components of research 
and development and direct product sales became a multi-million 
dollar market for American industry. Much of the research in fertility 
control culminated in products which came to represent a significant 
portion of the total profits of large US phannaceutical companies. 
Federal funding for population control research also tied universities 
to the government and corporate interests and to a particular ideolog-
ical approach to the problems of developing nations. Horowitz, among 
others, contends that the merging of corporate interests and academic 
research, as exemplified in population research, "has subverted the 
modern university into an office of external research for the State 
Department, the Pentagon and the international corporation" (1969: 37). 
The interest of corporate capitalism in population control 
obviously involved more than the simple correlation between our 
presence in the Third World and an ability to control markets and 
ensure profits. The post-was growth of major corp0rations and indus-
tries reflected the already-present tendency towards the monopoli-
zation of the market by conglomerates and multinationals. As fewer, 
but larger conglomerates attempted to control world markets, there 
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emerged a corresponding tension between the old, competitive or market 
capitalism and the newer form of capitalist growth, corporate capital-
ism. In corporate capitalism, market influence no longer determines 
unit price and the nature of growth, they are instead determined by 
producers {Galbraith, 1956). Those in the private sector whose concern 
with the growth rate of Third World countries had initiated involvement, 
in this area of foreign policy, numbered among those most emeshed in 
the dynamics of corporate capitalism. 
Characteristic of corporate capitalism was a particular view 
towards "philanthropy", the nature of corporate responsibility for 
ameliorating conditions of poverty and deprivation, and the linkages 
between such responsibility and expansion/profit. As early as the 
first quarter of the twentieth century, the complexities of corporate 
growth had fostered a new alliance between the corporate class, 
philanthropic foundations and social intervention. During this period, 
the wealthy frequently sought to translate newly acquired fortunes into 
social status and recognition through their philanthropic involvement 
with health and medicine (Starr, 1982). The Rockefellers, Carnegie 
and other powerful capitalists were instrumental in the founding of 
medical schools, in the establishment of the largest charitable 
hospitals and in much of the early scientific medical research {Brown, 
1979; Starr, 1982). This involvement continued throughout the century, 
legitimating later claims over issues of demography, ecology and 
population control. The existence of corporate capitalism and its link 
to Third world philanthropy had a number of consequences: it enhanced 
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the public image of those contributing; it legitimated their influence 
over the shaping of both structural and ideological constraints and it 
continually worked to guarantee profits in a number of ways. 
Simple, market competition was no longer adequate for the demands 
of post-war capitalism. The multiplicity of needs of rapidly expanding 
corporations required a new composition of support systems, including 
a more educated labor force, assurance of technological advancement 
and increased government intervention in mediating conflict in favor 
of corporate interests. Involvement in foundations and universities 
and intervention in the lives of potentially dissatisfied poor shaped 
a new mode of profit realization and led to a particular model of 
development, clearly articulated in the post-World War II expansionist 
policies. In international development, corporate capitalism worked 
to ensure its continuation through a broad-based and comprehensive 
form of intervention. Brown identified the earlier role of the 
corporate class in integrating technology, philanthropy and industry 
to articulate "a strategy for developing a medical system to meet the 
needs of capitalist society" (1979: 4). In a similar manner, corporate 
capitalism of the mid-twentieth century initiated a broad range of 
activity in developing nations, designed to promote a particular form 
of economic development, creating the opportunity for increased profits 
for multinational firms, bolstered by control of indigenous social 
institutions. Central to much of this activity was the work and 
philosophy of the population establishment. 
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**** 
Funding for population control, first initiated in the private 
sector and later assumed in the public, continued to escalate during 
the 1970s. Spurred by US interest, established organizations such as 
the United Nations and the World Bank, established internal population 
divisions and initiated international population programs. Although 
multilateral programs received a broad base of financial support, a 
large percentage of the funding was initiated by the same private 
foundations which had initiated direct US intervention in Third World 
family planning a decade earlier. As had been true during the 1950s 
and early 1960s, the names of Rockefeller, Ford, McNamara and others 
continued to be instrumental in evaluating needs, recommending action 
and initiating appropriations. The tenor of the times is revealed in 
the following segment of Richard Nixon's Presidential Message of July 
18, 1969. 
In all of these international efforts, our programs should 
give further recognition to the impcrtant resources of 
private organizations and university research centers. 
As we increase our population and family planning efforts 
abroad, we also call upon other nations to enlarge their 
programs in this area •••• For high rates of population 
growth •.•. impair individual rights, jeopardize national 
goals and threaten international stability. (New York Times, 
July 19, 1969) 
Federal expenditures also continued to increase. By 1975, 
sixty-seven percent of the United States funding for health care under 
the Foreign Aid Assistance Act was for population planning programs. 
Encouraged by the availability of federal money, numerous.nonprofit 
organizations looked to population funding as "soft money" which could 
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be used to develop or expand unrelated programs (Mass, 1976). 
Private, nonprofit organizations involved in the business of 
administering and/or dispensing family planning also prospered. By 
1975, the Population crisis Committee had an annual budget in excess 
of $500,000 and the International Planned Parenthood Federation more 
than $17 million (Mass, 1976: 43-45). Coupled with funds either 
directly or indirectly involved with population planning were the huge 
amounts going to other areas of economic development, much of which 
was contingent upon the acceptance of family planning efforts by the 
recipient nation. Frequently, those active in international popula-
tion efforts also participated, in some way, in other areas of develop-
ment. (For example, the so-called "green revolution" initially was 
introduced by the Rockefeller Foundation.) Enormous profits stood to 
be gained through such intervention: in direct sales and in more 
indirect control of foreign products and fiscal policy. 
The implications of such bureaucratic growth are self-evident. 
As population control bureaucracies, both internal and external to 
government, expanded, they assumed a life of their own, independent 
of the particular administration in office in Washington. By the 
1970s, many of the developing nations had integrated population policy 
into their overall development plans, compared to a decade earlier 
when fewer than thirty percent of seventy development plans studied 
even acknowledged population as a potential internal problem (Simmons, 
1984). Integral to most development plans, was a-reliance on the 
external funding provided through the public and private sector. The 
38 
acceptance by developing nations of the need for external intervention 
in reducing fertility greatly enhanced the status and autonomy of the 
population establishment. Key officials and private funding sources 
solidified the network linking public and private business interests to 
benevolence. As indicated in Table 1., by the early 1970s, corporate 
capitalism's influence extended from the position of primary donors 
through various multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, 
staffed by members of the corporate class, into a variety of secondary 
donors and intermediaries whose membership also strongly reflected 
corporate interests. 
Table 1. 
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LEGEND: IUSSP - International Union for the Scientific Study of 
Population. FEPAFEM - Pan American Federation of 
Medical School Facilities. 
39 
Source: Dynamics of Population Policy in Latin America, T.L. McCoy, 
Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Books, 1974. 
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IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS AND THE RETENTION OF CORPORATE INFLUENCE 
Satisfaction with much of US foreign policy showed a marked 
decline during the latter half of the 1970s. In particular, there was 
dissatisfaction with what had come to be known as the "new directions" 
foreign policy which had been widely received by the development 
community a decade earlier, at its inception. The underlying assumption 
of "new directions" policy was that development must focus on the poor-
est of the poor, on the most needy in the underdeveloped nations. In 
other 'WOrds, those benefitting from US assistance should be "the poor 
majority in developing countries, not the wealthy elite" {National 
Journal, 5/29/82: 961). 
The depressed US economic climate of the 1970s, coupled with the 
Iranian hostage situation, served as the foci of criticism and source 
of promised reform during the 1980 presidential campaign. Foreign 
policy was a major target of criticism at both an economic and security 
level. Offered as an alternative to a "new directions" philosophy was 
an emphasis on private sector business expansion, and national and 
military security, as the primary foci of foreign assistance. The 
Reagan administration's attempt to re-establish a more market-oriented 
economy has expanded upon this philosophy in shaping foreign policy, 
seeking to build up foreign military aid and to strengthen the private 
business sector of the nations of the Third World. 
The administration's involvement in strengthening the private 
sector of the Third world reflects an important departure from the 
earlier interest in developing nations in which corporate capitalism 
sought to influence development and insure profit through a strategy 
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of integrated levels of economic planning. The present thrust is 
toward a more entrepeneurial approach, relying on what Reagan describes 
as old, Laissez-faire economics to promote both Third world and United 
States business interests. The ensuing tension between the established 
interests of corporate capitalism and the recent introduction of a more 
market-based capitalism within the Third World provides an important 
dynamic against which the issue of population control policy, and other 
forms of foreign policy, are articulated. 
Critical to the change in foreign policy direction was the 
administration's decision to foster private-sector initiative through 
the implementation of such programs as the Caribbean Basin initiative 
and US AID's Bureau for Private Enterprise. The goal of the Bureau is 
to provide financial assistance to the private sector of developing 
nations in order to promote " ••• productive, self-sustaining income and 
job-producing private sectors ••• using the financial, technological and 
management expertise of the US private sector .•. " (National Journal, 
5/29/82: 961). Established in July, 1982, the Bureau for Private 
Enterprise was headed by Elise R.W. duPont, Philadelphia lawyer and 
wife of the governor of Deleware, with no previous experience in 
development or foreign affairs. 
Change in directives indicated a philosophical change regarding 
development -- US AID, as one of the most important sources of our 
activities in the internal dynamics of foreign nations, now was 
42 
charged with eradicating Third World poverty through the private enter-
prise system. The present administration's implicit reluctance to 
participate in population control and policy setting through multi-
lateral organizations, accompanied by an expressed desire to exert a 
more direct form of control over American activities in developing 
nations, is an extension of a belief in the importance of the market 
and the private enterprise system as a means of effecting social change. 
In the area of family planning, this has evolved into what James 
Buckley, chief US delegate to the 1984 UN conference on Population, 
describes as "market-oriented population theory" (New York Times, 
8/8/84). Such a position stresses the primacy of free market economics 
in improving human conditions and views them as a "natural mechanism 
for slowing population growth" (New York Times, 8/8/84). 
Although the rhetoric of the Reagan administration appears to 
portend a shift in commitment towards existing foreign population 
control policy, to date, actual change is not as significant as some 
had feared it might be. During the 1980 campaign, Reagan appeared to 
align himself quite explicitly with the strong anti-abortion stance of 
the Right, and the abortion debate continued to color much of Reagan's 
first term domestic policy. The 1980 Supreme Court decision restrict-
ing the use of Medicaid funds for abortion has a number of political 
implications for population control. Not only does it have a direct 
bearing on the number of poor women able to obtain abortions, it also 
appeals to that constituency concerned with curtailing federal spend-
ing, thereby broadening the apparent base of support for a more 
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conservative approach to family planning. 
Internationally, the administration also has supported a popula-
tion policy reflecting the interests of the politically vocal Right. 
Of issue have been such matters as continued US support of programs 
offering "artificial" methods of birth control; organizations or 
governments endorsing coercive abortions and, of course, the debate 
over the level of us support to private-sector growth in the developing 
world. In 1985, the Administration announced its intention to restrict 
US AID funding to those agencies offering only "natural" methods of 
birth control (Chicago Tribune, 9/5/85). Congress, however, failed to 
support the restriction or any other attempt to lower significantly the 
total dollar amount appropriated for family planning within the Third 
World. The administration's position on appropriate forms of birth 
control and other related issues appears to be more of a political 
vehicle for the implementation, funding or support of other issues and 
programs than a hard line against existing practice in developing 
nations. 
In matters of foreign policy, potential funding and pressure 
from groups such as the American Life Lobby appear to have influenced 
Reagan's public stance' in opposition to abortion as a method of 
family planning. A critical issue has been the question of continued 
support to countries or international agencies which include coerced 
abortions as part of official family planning programs. Just prior 
to the 1984 World Population Conference in Mexico City which immediate-
ly preceeded the Republican convention, the White House issued a policy 
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statement, to be read at the conference, denying federal money to 
international organizations condoning abortions. At the same conference 
World Bank President, A.W. Clausen urged the attending nations to 
intensify their financial commitment to population regulation by 
quadrupling the existing level of funding available for family planning 
programs within the Third World (New York Times, 8/8/84). The contrast-
ing positions represent the tensions emerging between rhetorical changes 
at the administrative level and the consistency of the population estab-
lishment. 
In 1985, US appropriations for foreign aid (HJ Res 648-PL98-473) 
did exclude aid for population programs supporting coerced abortion 
and, in September, 1985, US AID Director McPherson announced the with-
drawal of $10 million originally allocated for United.Nations sponsor-
ed population programs, because of the inclusion of Chinese programs 
where coercive abortion is endorsed as part of the national effort to 
limit population growth (New York Times, 9/26/85). The withdrawal of 
American funding from United Nations population programs will have a 
significant impact on those nations relying exclusively on multilater-
al support; however, it will have little effect on the actual dollar 
amount of United States funding designated for population control. 
The $10 million has been earmarked fOr bilateral family planning, 
under more direct US control and for private, American agencies that 
provide international family planning services. Therefore, the 
decision seems to be more indicative of Reagan's attempt to placate 
the extreme pro-life movement and to exert direct control over 
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funding and programs, than actual commitment to an anti-birth control 
practice. More importantly, the fact that the actual appropriation 
amount was maintained indicates the pervasive influence of those 
wishing to continue foreign population programs, in some form, at the 
congressional level. 
Both domestically and in the area of foreign policy, the anti-
abortion position has been accompanied by periodic criticisms of 
federal sponsorship of anything other than "natural" methods of birth 
control. This position advocates family planning programs as centers 
of information and education concerning fertility cycles and the 
responsibility of each partner in controlling pregnancy. It implicitly 
advocates a Western, middle-class model of delayed fertility, in a two 
parent household, in which the presence and desirability of children 
is assumed. The exclusion of pharmaceutical products from accepted 
methods of birth control is an extension of the pro-life position. 
Although the merits of such programs have been debated in Congress, 
they appear to have little political importance, beyond the cumulative 
effect of conservative population politics on other, more significant 
legislation. The withdrawal of federal participation in medical/tech-
nological support of family planning would incure the hostility of the 
American Medical Association, major pharmaceutical corporations and 
other of the most influential lobbying groups in existence today. 
Likewise, when aspects of the combined impact of the Reagan 
administration and ideological shifts are evaluated, change is evident, 
but not of the type that significantly alters the level of involvement 
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of the population establishment. Although Reagan has contended that 
population is "an inherently 'neutral' factor that 'is not necessarily 
good or ill' in development" (Congressional Quarterly, 9/1/84: 2145), 
for the past four year Congress has appropriated in excess of Reagan's 
recommendations for overseas family planning program. US foreign aid 
for population control has grown by thirty percent since fiscal 1981 
(Congressional Quarterly, 9/1/84). 
THE SUSTAINING POWER OF BUREAUCRATIC INERTIA 
By 1984, the activities of what had come to be known as the 
population establishment had changed little from the days of its 
inception, some twenty years earlier. Those advocating continued high 
level participation in family planning in the Third World represented 
the same groups and organizations whose staff and boards reflected 
the same linkages between corporate interests and government, as had 
existed earlier. Furthermore, the pervasiveness of multinational 
corporate interests exerts a far stronger influence in the shaping of 
foreign policy than that of a collectivity of business looking to 
government to provide a "free market" for the realization of greater 
profit and economic stability. 
Testimony before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance 
and Security Economics (March 20, 1984), included that of Paul Demeny, 
Vice President of the Population Council, who spoke of the need for 
continued funding and commitment to population control, since the rapid 
growth of cheap labor in the Third world would put a strain on efforts 
to maintain free trade and could force the United States to retreat to 
a protectionist position. "Developed countries ••• cannot be expected 
passively to accept that the speed of structural transformation in 
their economies is determined by the reproductive decisions of hundreds 
of millions of couples in developing nations." Included also in 
testimony were the statements of the vice president of the Population 
Crisis Committee and the faculty from three universities, all of whom 
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spoke in favor of increased funding for family planning programs. 
A congressional conference on the New Economy held on June 6, 
1984, provided an opportunity for panelists, such as the vice president 
of international planning of Goldman and Sachs and the president of an 
international futures firm, to present a spectrum of concern over the 
continued threat of Third World population growth to US economic 
interests, both foreign and domestic. Jay Forrester of MIT's Sloan 
School of Management commented that the increase in agricultural 
productivity in some developing nations might actually enhance popula-
tion growth, until a situation is reached in which the social stress 
is "high enough to trigger atomic war. Atomic war is the ultimate 
limit to population growth" (Joint Economic Committee, Conference on 
the New Economy, 6/6/84: 46). In his introductory comments, Senator 
John Heinz (R-Penn), addressed the potential threat of unchecked 
subsidized foreign exports and "the total lack of assumed responsibility 
on the part of the less developed countries in this regard" (6/6/84: 5). 
The above comments reflect a form of paternalism reminiscent of 
the early involvement of the population establishment, as an extension 
of corporate capitalism's interest in expansion into the Third World. 
The situation facing the developing world continues to be defined from 
a nee-Malthusian perspective -- a perspective which denies the 
potential of substantial structural reorganization and best legitimates 
both the public and private sector's presence in this area. 
In 1984, congress appropriated $240 million for overseas family 
planning -- $28 million more than requested by Reagan for that fiscal 
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year (Congressional Quarterly, 9/1/84: 2145). Thus, despite the 
rhetoric of those supporting or those opposing family planning in 
developing nations, it would appear that the efforts of the agencies 
and organizations committed to reducing fertility and stabilizing 
population in the Third World will continue, in some form, into the 
forseeable future. Ideology and practice link development and popula-
tion growth to the interests of multinational firms, in a form of 
"corporate benevolence" fostered by influential foundations, research 
sites and think tanks and to the every-day reality of those involved 
in the business of limiting the growth rates of the Third World. In a 
plea for continued support by governments for world-wide birth control 
efforts, World Bank President A.W. Clausen reiterated the accepted 
perspective, linking development and population, and the continued 
influence of the population establishment on public policy in the 
following statement: 
Poverty and rapid population growth reinforce each 
other. Therefore the international community has no 
alternative but to cooperate with a sense of urgency, 
in an effort to slow population growth if development 
is to be achieved. 
(Quoted in the Chicago Tribune, 7/11/84: 1:1) 
The strength of this influence combines with a pragmatic 
realization of the impact of an annual growth rate of more than two 
percent within much of the Third World, to produce a collectivity of 
interest spanning public and private sectors and impervious to most 
political variability. 
PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE INTERESTS 
In drawing together an assessment of the role corporate capitalism 
has played in the evolution of foreign population policy, an attempt 
must be made to evaluate the effectiveness of the various policies in 
question. Evaluation of foreign population policy, however, is partic-
ularly problematic because quantitative analysis alone is inadequate. 
Looking at demographic projections or charts and graphs of past 
fertility/mortality rates provides only one aspect of the needed data 
for informed evaluation. A number of critical issues must be raised 
in assessing existing policy, not the least of which is the lack of 
specificity of policy goals, based in part on the blurring of the 
demarcation between population and development. This particular issue 
is succinctly described by an opponent of continued funding for US AID 
in the following statement: 
Aid is always coming up each year with a new approach 
and that is one of the reasons why it is very difficult 
for your committee and the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee to understand the bill ..• In 1961 AID was 
sold on the basis of communism •.• this year for two 
reasons .• 'our needs compel it' and 'our self-interest 
requires it'. (Statement of William Paddock, Committee 
on Foreign Relations, US Senate, June 26, 1973) 
Just as the language and motivation for US AID reflect the 
variability in the international and domestic situation, so too, does 
the evolution of the legitimation of foreign population policy reflect 
significant variability. The stated goals of population control have 
ranged from that of national security, to improvement in the lives 
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of the poor, to the prevention of a return to protectionism -- all 
making it extremely difficult to evaluate the efficacy of the policy. 
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Although statistics indicate that the average annual population 
growth rate in the Third World has dropped from 2.3 to 2.2 percent 
during the past ten years, the decrease in itself does not produce a 
significant impact on population numbers (Sewell, 1980). However, 
when these figures combine with the fact that eighty percent of the 
developing nations now have an official policy to reduce population 
growth, proponents of existing US policy can contend that the impact of 
our foreign policy is a positive realization of goals to reduce 
excessive fertility. Others, however, debate the absolute benefit of 
birth control programs to the Third World, when weighed against costs 
and alternative development programs, citing what development language 
has labelled the "bread vs loop" clash (Segal, 1973). This argument 
recalls a statement made earlier in the paper pointing to the criticism 
that policy rarely takes into consideration variability in belief 
system and culture within and between the countries of the Third World. 
Failure to change ideology supporting large families has been cited as 
a major failure of exisiting programs in family planning. 
The ethics of the debate emanate from an ambiguity in determining 
whether development and population must necessarily be part of the 
same general policy and whether the good of many precludes considera-
tions of individual rights and decision-making. Regardless of such 
ambiguity, corporate capitalism has retained an interest in a broadly 
supported level of involvement in the internal affairs of developing 
nations and through the efforts of the population establishment this 
interest is partially realized. 
More relevant to the present discussion is another set of 
indicators for assessing the effectiveness of us participation in 
population programs in the Third World. When considering who has 
benefitted from existing policy and which interests have shaped its 
dimensions, the role of corporate capitalism is evident. Since the 
inception of organized population control, a number of significant 
benefits have accrued to corporate interests in a variety of ways. 
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The ability to turn "benevolence to power" through involvement in 
fertility regulation has enhanced what Starr (1982) identifies as the 
"cultural authority" of big business. Such authority goes beyond the 
ability of multinationals to direct and shape policy and the course of 
development within the Third World. It reaffirms the legitamacy of 
the multinationals themselves, reinforcing an acceptance of their means 
of production and reproduction. The network of those involved in the 
various aspects of Third World population control strongly reflects 
the presence of corporate capitalism. The numerous organizations 
mentioned previously: the universities and research centers; 
foundations and other philanthropic organizations; industry and 
business, to varying degrees, all look to, or are, the site of corpor-
ate interests. All have benefitted from a form of affiliative power 
centered in the dynamics of population control. All have benefitted 
from funds generated directly and indirectly through foreign popula-
tion policy. In addition, business and industry have benefitted from 
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the economic and development aid made contingent upon acceptance of the 
conditions of US population policy and from the access. to materials 
and markets ensured by continued efforts to help developing nations 
replicate the economic and political models of the West. 
More importantly, however, the Third World has provided an 
arena in which social institutions and relations can be constrained 
and shaped to serve Western corporate interests, through a complex 
system of aid, investment and attempted control over the process of 
personal decision making. The network necessary to support the 
interests of corporate capitalism is, in part, reflected in the bureau-
cratic structuration of the population establishment network. Encom-
passing both the public and private sector -- academics, medicine, 
research and development, industry and government -- the population 
establishment epitomizes the tendency of bureaucracy to assume a life 
of its own, often impervious to environmental changes. The dollar 
amount of its operations, the number of staff present at all levels 
and the significant amount of decision-making capabilty provided by 
its existence all contribute to the need for the population establish-
ment to retain its form, regardless of the match between stated goals 
and actual conditions. This bureaucratic inertia, couple with the 
sustained dominance of corporate capitalism, provides a framework for 
analysis of US population control policy, permitting a more inclusive 
understanding of the relationship of population control to other 
foreign policy and to public support of private interests. 
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